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HISTORICAL BASES OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM *
By JOHN P. FRANK t
When James Madison and fifty-four other gentlemen met
in Philadelphia in May, 1787, they had a number of questions
on their minds more important to them than a federal judi-
ciary. Protection of commerce against disruption by state
taxes or regulations, an end to impairment of contracts, a
taxing system equal to the public needs, an executive depart-
ment-these were burning necessities to the fifty-five. Dis-
cussion in the country during the period of ratification usually
found livelier topics than courts or judges. Indeed, except
for a vigorous attack on the lack of a requirement for a civil
jury and less ardent attacks on diversity, the judiciary clauses
were almost immune from strenuous criticism or discussion.'
* Parts I and II of this essay will briefly synthesize developments
which preceded the adoption of the judiciary article of the Con-
stitution. Part III briefly states and explores certain theories,
some very tentative, as to the origin of particular jurisdiction
clauses. The origins of judicial review are outside the scope of
this article. Leading historical works on that subject are Haines,
"American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy" (1932); Beard, "The
Supreme Court and the Constitution" (1912); and articles col-
lected in 1 "Selected Essays on Constitutional Law" 1-174 (1938).
t B.A. 1938, University of Wisconsin; LL.B., M.A., 1940, University
of Wisconsin; J.S.D., 1947, Yale University. Member of the
Wisconsin and United States Supreme Court bars. Assistant Pro-
fessor of Law, Indiana University. Professor Frank desires to
express his appreciation for assistance to Mr. Charles Gaus, Mr.
Raymond Sweat, and Mr. Robert Walsman, students in his sem-
inar in American Legal History.
This article was prepared as part of a symposium on the
proposed revisions of the Judicial Code in "Law and Contempo-
rar Problems," the publication of Duke University School of
Law. It recently appeared in that publication and is reprinted
here as of possible interest to the Indiana Bar.
1. There were three principal sources of opposition to the judiciary
portions of the Constitution: First, the lack of a guarantee ofjury trial in civil cases; second, the provision giving the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction "both as to Law and Fact"; and
third, the diversity provisions. Patrick Henry's denunciation of
the Constitution for its lack of a civil jury guarantee is typical
of countless expressions of that objection. 3 "Elliott's Constitu-
tional Debates" 544, 545 (1901), hereafter cited as Elliott. The
"and Fact" objection was closely related, and was based on the
assumption that the Court was thus empowered to ignore if it
chose the findings of juries. For example of this fear, see Lee,
"Letters of a Federal Farmer" in Ford, "Pamphlets on the Con-
stitution" 294, 308 (1888). Edmund Pendleton, Chief Justice of
the Virginia Court of Appeals, was, in the opinion of Madison and
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In short, while there was in 1787 a felt need for a fed-
eral judiciary, it was not an overwhelming need. The con-
tract clause had its Shay's Rebellion, the prohibition of state
coinage had its state tender laws, the Senate and the House
had their Great Compromise, the prohibition on state tariffs
had its history of state tariffs.2 Similarly the judicial sys-
tem is in part the product of single definite episodes, but in
part precise causes may never be found because they lie no
deeper than the common sense of the Committee on Detail of
the Constitutional Convention. In this history it is sometimes
easier to find predecessors than origins.
I. THE EARLIER SYSTEMS
A. Colonial General Courts 3
The thirteen colonies of course had differences in the
structure of their legal systems, but certain basic general
features stand out. The colonies usually began with a system
of complete executive, legislative, and judicial power merged
in a central dominant official, as in early Virgina, 4 or group,
as in Massachusetts. As pressure of business and the spread
Washington, the most effective supporter of the Constitution in
the Virginia convention; Hilldrup, "Life and Times of Edmund
Pendleton" 280 (1939). Of the "and Fact" phrase, Pendleton
said, "Though I dread no danger, I wish these words had been
buried in oblivion. If they had, it would have silenced the greatest
objections against the section." 3 Elliott 519. The Seventh Amend-
ment was inended to allay the foregoing fears. The many cri-
ticisms of diversity jurisdiction were primarily aimed at the fear
that litigants would be required to travel great distances and liti-
gate at great expense. See, for example, Lee in Ford, supra at
308. Both Massachusetts and New Hampshire recommended sharp
limitations on the diversity jurisdiction. I Elliott 322, 323, 326.
Yet this discussion must be seen in proportion. 3 "Correspondence
and Public Papers of John Jay" (1891) discusses the adoption of
the Constitution at length and makes no appreciable mention of
the judiciary. Neither does Spaulding, "His Excellency George
Clinton" (1938), although Clinton was a leading opponent of the
Constitution in New York.
2. One of the many accounts of the Constitution with analyses of
these problems is in 1 Morison and Commager, "The Growth of
the American Republic" cc. 12 and 13 (1942).
3. For a detailed study of court structure in each colony, see Pound,
"Organization of Courts" 26-90 (1940). The most extensive study
of one system is Goebel and Naughton, "Law Enforcement in
Colonial New York" (1944).
4. Chitwood, "Justice in Colonial Virginia" in 23 "Johns Hopkins
Univ. Studies in Hist. and Pol. Sci." 13 (1905).
5. For an account of the Massachusetts system, see Davis, "History
of the Judiciary of Massachusetts" 1-175 (1944). Merger of
functions is a common aspect of colonial societies which lack
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of population compelled it, the judicial business fell into
specialized hands, and local or regional courts were estab-
lished. Appeals from local courts to the governor or council
or to the colonial legislature were common, with final appeal
to the Privy Council.
The justice administered in colonial courts was usually
as learned and frequently as pompous as its practitioners
could make it. On occasion it was more pompous than learn-
ed., A few colonial lawyers studied in England, but only a
few, and the largest law library in New York early in the
eighteenth century contained 152 volumes.7  A Maryland
court in 1772, overcome with the difficulty of a problem, re-
ferred it to those lawyers lounging about the court room for
a solution," and a traveler in seventeenth-century Virginia
noted that "a liberal supply of strong drink often makes
Justice nod and drop the scales."
A description of the system in Virginia suggests the
commonly met problems.10 Justice was originally declared by
a Council, replaced in a few years by a Governor. The gross
cruelties of administration between 1610 and 1619 by Lord
de ]a Warr and Governor Dale were followed by a transfer
of supreme judicial power to the Assembly, where it remained
until 1682. Then the legislative judicial authority ended, sup-
planted by a "General Court" consisting of the Governor and
his Council, which he appointed.
enough personnel for divided government or enough business to
warrant it. Simultaneously with American development, the
same phenomenon was occurring under Dutch rule in South
Africa. Kennedy and Schlosberg, "The Law and Custom of the
South African Constitution"' 5-8 (1935).
6. McMillen, "County Courts of Colonial Virginia" 11 (unpublished
thesis in Indiana University Library, 1935).
7. Hamlin, "Legal Education in Colonial New York" 76 (1939).
Hamlin, who has written a very interesting description of this
subject, says that 236 members of the New York bar before 1815
had studied at the Inns of Court, most of them after the Revolu-
tion. Id. at 17, 18. Apprenticeship in an English office cost from
£200 to £300 for five years. Id. at 21 (n.35), 33.
8. Nicholson v. Sligh, 1 H. & McH. (Md.) 434 (1772). On the
untrained New Hampshire judges, see Reinsch, "English Common
Law in the Early American Colonies" 27, 28 (1899).
9. McMillen, op. cit, supra n.6, at 12, quoting Colonel William Byrd.
10. The following two paragraphs are drawn from Chitwood, supra
n.4, and McMillen, op. cit. supra n.6; George L. Chumbley,
"Colonial Justice in Virginia" (1938) ; and Walter B. Richards,
"Genesis of the Federal Judicial System" 15 (Address, Virginia
State Bar Association (1904), pamphlet in the Library of
Congress).
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Yet from the beginning regional courts were necessary,
and the "monthly court" system was created in 1624 and
became the county court system in 1643. These courts, com-
posed usually of eight members, decided local cases by ma-
jority vote and also had extensive administrative duties, such
as making tax assessments, appointing inspectors to receive
wolf heads from the Indians for bounty, and fixing prices at
local taverns. In the eighteenth century these courts were
supplemented by magistrate's courts each with a single judge
to handle cases up to twenty-five shillings. Appeals in civil
cases could be taken up the scale of courts and eventually to
England if progressively larger sums of money or tobacco
were involved. In addition to these three courts, there were
also courts of hustings, a court of oyer and terminer, special
slave courts, and the Court of the Commissary of the Bishop
of London."
Even so brief a sketch as this suggests certain basic
features of the early colonial court system: (1) The courts
went to the people; (2) courts were part of an amalgamated
system of government with no rigid separation of executive,
legislative, and judicial functions; (3) the accessibility of
particular courts depended in civil cases on the amount in-
volved ;12 (4) the colonists were conditioned to a great num-
ber of courts and an elaborate system of appeals.
B. Privy Council
The most significant aspect of Privy Council review of
colonial legal problems is that, by virtue of the Council's
double jurisdiction, it merged into one body the systems of
both'judicial and legislative review.13 It could disapprove of
11. Chitwood, supra n.4, at 70, reports that the Bishop's court had
jurisdiction of offenses by the clergy4 but this jurisdiction could
not have been exclusive, for the church wardens and vestrymen
proceeded in general court against a delinquent clergyman who
allegedly "cared not of what religion he was so that he got the
tobacco, nor what became of the flock so that he could get the
fleece." Goodwin v. Lunan, Jeff. Va. Rep. 96, 97 (1771).
12. In sharp contradistinction to our present federal system, how-
ever, appeals also depended primarily on the amount involved.
13. For discussion, see 1 Haines, "American Doctrine of Judicial
Supremacy" 44-66 (2d ed. 1932). For extensive studies of the
appellate work of the Privy Council, see Hazeltine, "Appeals from
Colonial Courts to the King in Council with Especial Reference
to Rhode Island" Ann. Rep. Am Hist. Ass'n 323 (1894);
Schlesinger, "Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council" 28 Pol. Sci.
Q. 440 (1913); Kellogg, "The American Colonial Charter" 1 Ann.
Rep. Am. Hist. Ass'n 187, 267 (1903); 3 Osgood, "American
Colonies, 18th Century" 304-307 (1924).
1048]
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statutes by veto and could also invalidate a colonial statute
in the course of deciding a case. A foremost example was the
invalidation of the Connecticut intestacy distribution statute
because it conflicted with common-law conceptions of primo-
geniture.14 The jurisdictional amount, set at £300 in 1753 in
particular types of cases,15 none the less left the Council with
a sizable jurisdiction.
It is the general and unchallenged opinion of scholars
that the Privy Council system is a real antecedent of the
modern Supreme Court and the modern system of judicial
review.16 Jefferson desired in 1787 that the Supreme Court
should be part of a "Coincil" with a general veto over le-
gislation.'1 Jefferson did not then, of course, anticipate that
his views of the judiciary would change when he knew Mar-
shall better, but it may surely be hazarded that he was led to
his initial impulse by his acceptance of the Privy Council
system.
The Privy Council served a more important function
than that of review of legislation. It also heard border dis-
putes between the colonies. In our own placid acceptance of
the federal system, we are accustomed to think of state rival-
ries being settled from year to year on the gridirons of state
universities; but in the 1780's unsettled border disputes would
have meant war. The Privy Council settled at least nine
such disputes,18 and the removal of its service as arbiter left
a void which was filled clumsily under the Confederation and
conclusively by the Constitution.
C. Admiralty
It was absolutely imperative that the problems normally
decided by admiralty courts be decided by someone, and ad-
miralty courts were among the first established in the colo-
14. An easy-to-read account of the case is Adams, "Revolutionary
New England, 1691-1776" 126-130 (1923).
15. 1 Labaree, "Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors"
No. 453, 325-327, and see 329 (1935).
16. See, for example, Thayer, "Legal Essays" 1, 3 (1908); 1 Hockett,
"The Constitutional History of the United States" 155 (1939).
11. Letter, Jefferson to Madison, December 20, 1787, IV "Doc.
History of the Constitution" 411 (Dep't State 1905), cited here-
after as Doc. Hist.
18. Discussed briefly in 1 Hockett, op. cit. supra n.16, at 155, and
in Sargeant's essay in "Duponceau, Jurisdiction" 141 (1824).
[Vol. 23
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nies. 9 Admiralty courts had begun in England in the four-
teenth century, and as early as 1360 Sir John Beauchamp
was given authority to try pirates, 20 a problem thereafter
existing in both hemispheres.21 The first admiralty court in
North America was established in Newfoundland in 1615
when Sir Richard Whitbourne was given authority as ad-
miral to punish Sabbath breaking, fouling the fairways, and
burning forests ashore. The first case in Massachusetts oc-
curred in 1630 when Thomas Moulton, pilot, chose between
flogging and a forty-shilling fine for deserting his ship at
Plymouth.
In the seventeenth century a system of vice-admiralty
courts, dominated by the colonial governor, spread through
the colonies. They had then and retained later two primary
types of jurisdiction: (1) ordinary marine cases, including
wages and salvage; and (2) prize cases.22 However, in the
latter portion of the seventeenth century Britain began to
enforce her navigation and trade acts against the colonies,
a step which led directly to reorganization of the admiralty
courts.
In England, forfeitures for violation of revenue or navi-
gation laws were heard not in admiralty, but in Exchequer.
Experience in the colonies proved that juries would not con-
vict their fellow colonials in trade cases, 23 and in 1697 the
admiralty courts were reorganized to utilize their non-jury
procedures in the colonies to enforce the acts of trade. The
gubernatorial control was eliminated, and the vice-admiralty
courts became Crown courts with added trade jurisdiction.24
19. Two leading studies of colonial admiralty courts are Andrews,
'"ice Admiralty Courts in the Colonies" in Towle, "Records of
the Vice Admiralty Court of Rhode Island, 1716-1752" 1-79(1936); and Cramp, "Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction in the 17th
Century" " Royal Empire Social Study No. 5" (London, 1931).
Other authorities are collected in Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318
U.S. 133, 137, n.1, and 144, n.6 (1943).
20. The references in this paragraph are taken from Crump, op. cit.
supra n.19, c.1.
21. For documents on piracy, see Jameson, "Privateering and Piracy
in the Colonial Period" (1923). Pages 190-257, e.g., contain the
papers in the case of Captain Kidd.
22. These are discussed extensively in Andrews, op. cit. supra n.19,
at 24-59.
23. Id. at 74.
24. For discussion in addition to Andrews, see 1 Carson, "History of
the Supreme Court of the United States" 27-38 (1905), hereafter
referred to as Carson.
19481 241
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The result was the emergence of a new type of admiralty
court in the colonies from which appeals lay first to the High
Court of Admiralty5 and, near the end of the colonial period,
to the Privy Council.26 Developments in these new courts
were not uniform, but they were trending in a distinctly
non-English direction, a historical fact to which the Supreme
Court has recently failed to give sufficient weight.
2 7
The admiralty system retained a qualified popularity in
the colonies despite the extreme dissatisfaction with the util-
ization of those courts for trade control. Efforts made in
colonial times to establish juries in admiralty were blocked
by the Privy Council,28 but several of the states during the
Revolution did add juries. The real dissatisfaction with ad-
miralty courts, however, was apparently with the law they
enforced rather than their procedure, for the attempt to en-
graft a jury system did not survive the Constitution.29
D. The Confederation
The Revolution eliminated those two essential portions
of the American legal system which were dependent wholly
on England: the Privy Council disposition of cases between
states, and the vice-admiralty courts. The latter, particularly
in wartime, required a substitute.
The Revolution began under the oagis of the Continental
Congress, which was legally no more than a conclave of am-
bassadors of independent states. One of the first tasks of
these representatives was the creation of a form of govern-
ment, and the Articles of Confederation were agreed to in
Congress in November, 1777, though they were not ratified
until 1781.
25. Thus the High Court of Admiralty had jurisdiction over a class
of appeals coming from the Colonies which it could not have
heard in cases arising in England. The Vrouw Dorothea (1754),
reported in The Fabius. 2 C. Rob. 245, 165 Eng. Rep. 304 (1800).
26. Andrews, op. cit. supra n.19, at 22.
27. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943), holding that a state
court had jurisdiction to condemn a fish net used in violation
of state law. It had theretofore been thought that all maritime
causes of action in rem must be brought in admiralty.
28. Andrews, op. cit. supra n.19, at 9, 10.
29. See §9, Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 77 (1789). It would be interesting
to know exactly why juries were considered so unsuitable for
admiralty. The Governor of Providence Island (off Nicaragua)
recorded in his diary that he stopped jury trials in admiralty
there in 1638 because "thes Jurors proved themselves soe absurde
and ignorant as sone made me finde the miserie of trialls in
these dayes ..... Jameson, op. cit. supra n.21, at 8.
[Vol. 23
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In establishing a judicial system, the draftsmen of the
articles had no North American precedents. The Articles of
Confederation of the United Colonies of New England in
1643 had contained a commissioner system which could only
by a stretch be called "judicial,"30 and Benjamin Franklin's
Albany Plan of 1754 had no judicial provisions at all.31 Yet
the Confederators had a void to fill.
They wrote into the articles three basic provisions for
dealing with judicial problems. The Confederacy was to have
authority to punish piracy, quickly delegated to state officials
in practice3 2 A court was established to hear appeals in ad-
miralty cases, and an almost incredibly clumsy system for
arbitrating interstate border disputes was created which was
actually utilized in three cases and which averted real war
between Pennsylvania and Connecticut over the Wyoming
lands.3
3
The principal national judicial system during the Revol-
ution was in admiralty, an oft-told story. In a word, as
American vessels began to take prizes, General Washington
found himself seriously distracted from military duties by
pleas that he dispose of the booty. In November, 1775, he
asked Congress to take steps to have such cases decided, and
it immediately called upon the states to create their own ad-
30. For discussion of the United Colonies, see Andrews, "Colonial
Self-Government, 1652-1689" c.3 (1904). Article 8 authorized
the Commissioners to consult "about free and speedy passage of
justice in each jurisdiction to all the confederates equally ... "
Bowen, "Documents of the Constitution of England and America"
83 (1854); and see also Article 6, id. at 82.
31. The Plan contemplated a Grand Council to govern, inter alia,
Indian trade and treaties. Bowen, op. cit. supra n.30, at 87.
For William Penn's plan for union, see Long, "Genesis of the
Constitution" 113-116 (1926).
32. Article IX granted authority for "appointing courts for the
trial of piracies and felonies," a function delegated to the states
by the Confederation Congress. 19 Jour. Cont. Cong. 354 (1912).
33. Article IX provided that for border disputes Congress was to
create a panel of thirty-nine, from which the parties would strike
alternately until thirteen were left, from which the panel should
be drawn by lot. Professor Jameson has shown that this system
was modeled after the English Election Act of 1770. In England
the process of selection was known as "knocking out the brains
of the committee" because each side sought to eliminate the
ablest supporters of the adversary. Jameson, "The Predecessor
of the Supreme Court" in "Essays in Constitutional History" 1
(1889). The border dispute cases, including the Wyoming dispute
in which Connecticut enlisted the military aid of the neighboring
Green Mountain boys, are described by Jameson at page 3, and
by Carson, op. cit. sapra n.24, at 66-79. Each case is described
in 131 U.S. App. I-bdi (1888).
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miralty courts with right of appeal to Congress. The states
did so, and appeal cases were heard first by the Congress,
later by a standing committee, and finally by the Court of Ap-
peals in Cases of Capture, the first American national court,
which functioned in anticipation of and under the Confed-
eration3
This admiralty system was of vital significance in the con-
duct of the war because it was used to permit both privateers
and national vessels to cash out their prizes quickly. Congress
established prize agents throughout the colonies to condemn
enemy ships in admiralty courts, and occasionally a captain
invading an area where prize agents were unavailable was
told to "employ some suitable attorney to libell for" his
prizes5
The system worked, but it worked poorly. The Court of
Appeals and its predecessors did hear 109 cases.3 6 Occasion-
ally state courts decided in favor of state interests and then
refused to comply with a congressional reversal.37 Even more
serious, privateers anxious to make profitable captures might
seize neutral ships. An over-zealous capture of two Span-
ish vessels, brought to a Massachusetts court which would not
subject itself to federal review, very nearly cost the colonies
the friendship of that important neutral s The experience of
the Confederation convinced virtually every conscientious pat-
riot of the 1780's that the admiralty jurisdiction ought to be
totally, effectively, and completely in the hands of the national
government; and an extended search has not revealed a cri-
ticism from any contemporary source of the clause of the
Constitution granting federal admiralty jurisdiction."
34. The leading study on this subject is Professor Jameson's essay,
supra n.33. See also Carson, op. tit. supra, n.24, cc.4, 5.
35. This system is fully documented in "Out-Letters of the Continental
Marine Committee and Board of Admiralty, 1776-1780" (Paullin
ed. 1914), and the quotation is taken from the letter to Captain
John Barry, Jan. 29, 1778, Vol. 1, 198, 199.
36. 131 U.S. App. xxxv-xlix lists the cases.
37. For details see Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 54 (U.S. 1795) and
U.S. v. Judge Peters, 5 Cranch 115 (U.S. 1809).
38. 24 Jour. Cont. Cong. 227, 386 (1922). For account of the Massa-
chusetts practice, see Van Tyne, "American Revolution" 190-192(1905).
39. Privateering was a business, and the businessmen became thor-
oughly dissatisfied with disorderly handling of admiralty cases
early in the war. In 1779 sixty-eight of the leading citizens of
Philadelphia, including Robert Morris, James Wilson, and Thomas
Fitzsimons, who were all to be delegates to the Constitutional
244 [Vol. 23
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II. THE INFERIOR FEDERAL COURTS
The Constitutional Convention had to decide whether
to establish a governmental system fairly clearly divided into
basic legislative, executive, and judicial departments or whe-
ther to continue the frequent colonial device of amalgamation.
The oft-heard theory that the Fathers read Montesquieu,
thereby misunderstood the British constitution, and as a re-
sult created the tripartite system of government, seems most
unlikely.40 Madison, for example, had systematically studied
the governments of the world from the earliest times in anti-
cipation of the Convention, and knew perfectly well what he
was talking about.41 The evidence is that on the merits the
Convention preferred divided authority and that Montesquieu
was a good source of rationalization; but the choice when
made was defended on the basis of colonial experience, and
even so, complete separation was not the prime purpose.42
This is apparent in the history of the judiciary. The
original Randolph plan provided for "one or more supreme
tribunals" and a system of lower courts; but the judges were
to be chosen by the legislative rather than the executive
branch, and "a convenient number" of them were to parti-
cipate with the Executive in a "council of revision" to veto
Convention, petitioned for a permanent court of admiralty with
fixed judges, saying, "In the privateering trade in particular, the
very life of which consists in the adventurers receiving the re-
wards of their Success and Bravery as soon as 
the Cruize is
ove , the least delay is uncommonly destructive." Jameson, "The
Predecessor of the Supreme Court" in "Essays 
in Constitutional
History" 24, 26 (1889).40. For statments approaching this, see Fiske, "The Critical Period
of American History" 291 (1888); and Sir Henry Maine, in
"Popular Government" says, " . . . neither the institution of aSupreme Court, nor the entire structure of the Constitution of
the United States, were the least likely to occur to anybody's mind
before the publication of the Esprit des Lois." Quoted and
discussed in Stevens, "Sources of the Constitution of the UnitedSttes 185, 186 (1894).
41. Even though Federalist Paper XLVII makes him look as though
he did not know, in respect to M\ontesquieu. For a critique ofthe Montesquieu theory, see Radin, "The Doctrine of the Separa-
tion of Powers in Seventeenth Century Controversies" 86 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 842 (1938). For an example of Madison's extensive
preparatory analysis before the Convention, see his elaborate
memorandum, recopied by Washington for his own use, on con-
temporary and ancient governments. IV Doc. Hist. 138.
42. See Madison's discussion of the state practice in this regard in
Federalist Paper XLVII.
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acts of Congress. The courts were also to try impeach-
ments.
43
The disputes of the members of the Convention concern-
ing the judiciary turned on a few questions: Should the
judiciary try impeachments (a question not of interest here) ;
how should judges be chosen, how compensated, and how long
should they serve; and should there be any lower federal
courts? It was accepted without question that there should
be a Supreme Court.
The Randolph proposal provided for lower federal courts,
and this general principle was tentatively adopted on June
4, 1787, with no substantial discussion.4 But there was
strong sentiment in the Convention to leave all litigation at
the trial stage to the state courts, a principle of the competing
Paterson plan,45 and on June 5 Rutledge of South Carolina
moved reconsideration of the original decision by which the
lower courts had been accepted. To him and to Sherman of
Connecticut, appellate review by the Supreme Court was
enough to protect the federal interests, and Sherman added
that duplicate federal trial courts were too expensive.46
Madison opposed 'reconsideration, arguing that the
volume of appeals would be unmanageable and that biased
jury verdicts or biased trial court directions would escape any
effective appellate review.
Rutledge and Sherman carried conviction to the dele-
gates, and a motion to eliminate lower federal courts carried,
five to four, with two states divided. Thereupon Madison and
Wilson saw and took the opportunity for seeming compromise
which eventually gave them all. The defeated Randolph pro-
posal had required that lower courts be established; Madison
and Wilson moved to give Congress the option to establish
lower courts. The difference was enough to double the vote
for lower courts, and the new resolution was fixed in the
Constitution by a vote of eight to two.
The method of appointing judges was similarly the pro-
duct of compromise. A move for exclusive executive ap-
pointment, countered by a move for exclusive legislative se-
43. 1 Farrand, "The Records of the Federal Convention" 20, 21(1937).
44. Id. at 104, 105.
45. Id. at 244.
46. The discussion of the reconsideration may be found in id. at
124-125.
246 [Vol. 23
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lection, resulted in compromise on the Massachusetts system
of executive selection with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate.4 7 Thus the large states, which saw benefit in purely exec-
utive appointment, and the small states, which would have
disproportionate representation in the Senate, each had a
portion of their way.48
Eventual agreement on Article III involved adjustments
throughout the article. As a convenience of discussion, the
delegates talked about types of courts, methods of appoint-
ment or compensation, and jurisdiction separately. Yet they
obviously interact. A man's judgment as to structure may be
affected by his concept of jurisdiction. The process of the
Constitutional Convention brought a review of historical
practice, a compromise of conflicting interests and political
necessities, and the creation of a genuinely new type of judi-
cial organization.49
III. THE ELEMENTS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction posed as many problems as the system
itself. For this, too, Randolph and Paterson had answers.
The original Randolph plan, which envisioned lower courts,
47. For discussion, see 2 Farrand 41-44.
48. Richards, op. cit. supra n.10, at 23.
49. The establishment of the lower court system was the "transcendent
achievement" of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Frankfurter and
Landis, "The Business of the Supreme Court" 4 (1927). After
the adoption of the Constitution, the judiciary system was given
two major examinations, once in connection with proposed Con-
stitutional amendments, and once in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
The history of the Act is told in Warren, "New Light on the
History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789" 37 Harv. L. Rev.
49 (1923). The principal question to be decided was whether
the Congress would take up the option given it to establish lower
courts. The Senate attitudes are discussed by Warren at 65-69,
and the House attitudes at 123 et seq. The Senate debate is
unrecorded, and the House debate, though extensive, offers sub-
stantially nothing which would illumine the pre-1787 conditions
leading to Article III other than the basic sentiment that state
courts were untrustworthy, particularly in federal question cases.
Warren, 124. The other problem was that of amendments to the
Constitution itself. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
Amendments did affect judicial procedures, but Madison's proposal
to avoid "vexatious appeals" by requiring a minimum, amount for
appeals to the United States Supreme Court was lost. See Madi-
son tA, Pendleton, Sept. 14 and 23, 1789, V Doc. Hist. 205, 210;
Warren 118-119. In the letter of September 23, Madison reported
that others felt that amount was no measure of importance,
particularly in constitutional cases. Madison was probably able
to accept an opposite point of view because of familiarity with




gave jurisdiction which may be summarized as jurisdiction
in admiralty, in cases between citizens of different states or
foreigners, in cases of federal revenue, in cases of impeach-
ment, and as to "questions which may involve the national
peace and harmony."'50 The Paterson plan, assuming appellate
juridiction only, deleted the diversity jurisdiction in cases of
citizens of different states and the "national peace" clause,
and added specific reference to treaty cases and federal trade
regulation cases. 51 The Convention tentatively gave jurisdic-
tion in revenue, impeachment, and national peace cases and
sent the clause to the Committee on Detail to work out the
remainder.5 2
The work of that Committee must be seen in relation to
the basic general purposes of the Constitution. Those pur-
poses need not be reviewed. Suffice it to say that they in-
cluded the establishment of a government which could keep
domestic and international peace and which would give full
protection to the property and business interests which for
various reasons felt much in need of it. It was clearly con-
templated that the judges were to be conservative and sound
men of property. That most of the delegates at Philadelphia
were such men is old knowledge. 58 They were businessmen
and landholders and the lawyers of businessmen and land-
holders, and they conceived of like men, or indeed of them-
selves, 54 as judges under the new system. A good share of the
judicial business necessarily would concern property interests,
and jurisdictional clauses must be considered accordingly.
For convenience of analysis, the nine federal jurisdic-
tional clauses may be viewed, with some overlapping, from
three standpoints: (1) an effective national government;
50. Farrand, op. cit. supra n.43.
51. Ibid.
62. The principal references in the Madison Journal are 1 Farrand
223, 224, 230, 231, 244, 317; 2 id. at 41-46, 129 et seq.
53. The leading analysis from this standpoint is of course Beard,
"An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution," c.5, 73-151
(1935 ed.).
54. On September 28, 1789, President Washington appointed delegates
Wilson, Blair, and Rutledge to the Supreme Court, delegate Bed-
ford to the district court for Delaware, and delegate Read as
United States Attorney in Delaware. For Wilson's remarkable
application for the Chief Justiceship ("My aim rises to the im-
portant office of Chief Justice of the United States"), see 1
Warren, "The Supreme Court in United States History" 33, 34
(1926 ed).
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(2) international obligations; and (3) the interests of pro-
perty.
A. An Effective National Government
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equityus arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States . . . ; to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more
States."
These are the most important jurisdictional provisions
of the Constitution from the standpoint of the basic political
maintenance of the government. Without any one of them,
it may fairly be doubted whether the government could have
survived. So much cannot be said of any other jurisdictional
clause, with the possible exception of the treaty provision.
For the purpose of this analysis, the "federal question"
and "United States party" clauses may be considered to-
gether. The basic weakness of the Confederation had been
its inability to make and enforce those demands which are the
proper prerogatives of government. Article I gave the new
Congress power to make demands. Article III gave a method
of enforcing them.
The Confederation had no means of participating in
either civil or criminal litigation except on the sufferance of
the states. The state courts had to settle federal military
accounts ;56 only the state courts could punish such offenses
as treason ;57 only the state courts could punish theft of fed-
eral property or frauds on the government. 8  The Confed-
55. The inclusion of equity in this fashion is attributed to Connecticut
delegate William Samuel Johnson, who had grown attached to that
practice in England. Groce, "William Samuel Johnson" 165-167
(1937). It was criticized by the "Federal Farmer" for permitting
merger of law and equity powers in one judge. "... for if the
law restrain him, he has only to step into his shoes of equity and
give what judgment his reason or opinion may dictate." Ford,
"Pamphlets on the Constitution" 308 (1888).
56. For discussion of some of these problems, see Sargeant's Essay in
"Duponceau, Jurisdiction" (1924); 1 Carson, op. cit. supra n.24,
c.7; 22 Jour. Cont. Cong. 83, 102 (1914); 23 id. at 773.
57. See the numerous treason cases in 1 Dallas. For extensive dis-
cussion of the treatment of treason in the Revolution, see Hurst,
"Treason in the United States" 58 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 246-272
(1944).
58. See for examples Respublica v. Sweers, 1 Dall. 41 (U.S. 1779)
(deputy Commissary-General charged with fraud in connection
with army stores); Respublica v. Powell, 1 Dall. 47 (U.S. 1780)
(army baker charged with short weighting).
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eration could merely appoint its attorneys to go into the state
courts. 59
The sponsors of the Constitution deeply believed that no
government could exist without power to enforce its requis-
itions and its laws. 0 These clauses reflect that conviction.
As for suits between states, no more need be said. From
the earliest times to 1787, except for the short period 1775
to 1781, there had been a method of settling interstate dis-
putes. The jurisdiction formerly in the Privy Council and
then in the arbitral commissions of the Confederation was
transferred to the new Supreme Court.6 1
B. International Affairs
" to all Cases . . . arising under . . . Treaties
; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Min-
isters and Consuls; to all Cases of Admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction."
The Confederation had found itself powerless to conduct
the international affairs of the states.62 It could make agree-
ments, but it could not enforce them. It could not even extend
to foreign nations an assurance of protection of their rep-
resentatives in America. The treaty with Great Britain,
particularly in respect to debts payable to British merchants
or creditors, was being ignored ;63 and the case of de Long-
champs had great potential of national embarrassment.
The Chevalier de Longchamps had a standing grudge
against Francis Barbe Marbois, French consul-general at
Philadelphia. Epithets at the consulate were followed by
blows on the street, and though the French official had the
best of the battle, further punishment for de Longchamps
59. As in the Sweers case, cited supra n.58.
60. Citations would be merely cumulative. The basic social evil to be
remedied, as Washington expressed it in a gloomy letter to Madi-
son before the Convention, March 31, 1787, was put thus: 'I
confess, however, that my opinion of public virtue is so far
changed that I have my doubts, whether any system without the
means of Coercion in the Sovereign will enforce due obedience to
the Ordinances of a general Government without which everything
else fails." IV Doc. Hist. 102.
61. The threat of interstate war and past devices are considered by
Hamilton in Federalist Paper LXXX.
62. The judiciary is discussed from the standpoint of maintenance of
international peace in Federalist Paper LXXX.
63. Wilson discussed the ill consequences of the non-enforcement of
the British treaty in the Pennsylvania convention. 2 Elliott
489, 490.
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was in order. He was prosecuted in Pennsylvania courts and
heavily-almost preposterously heavily-sentenced, doubtless
more as a menace to relations with France than as a threat to
the peace.6 4
None the less, suppose Pennsylvania had not prosecuted.
The foreign relations of every state were at the mercy of the
one state in which an incident occurred. The Convention was
convinced that if foreign officials were either to seek justice
at law or be subjected to its penalties, it should be at the hand
of the national government. The Supreme Court proceeded
immediately to enforce the British treaty,65 and the lower
courts heard numerous cases like that of de Longchamps 6
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction had a double
purpose, both international and economic. Admiralty cases
might involve the relations of the United States with foreign
countries, and the same basic conviction which gave national
jurisdiction in respect to treaties and ambassadors required
it here. The lines between piracy and privateering were
thin, and yet the difference might affect war and peace; and
the seizure of the two Spanish ships during the Revolution
taught a strong lesson. There were few to contest the argu-
ment of James Wilson that admiralty jurisdiction must be
wholly national since "it related to cases not within the juris-
diction of particular states, and to a scene in which contro-
versies with foreigners would be most likely to happen.
67
64. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 Dall. 111 (U.S. 1784). The
defendant was heavily fined, sentenced to imprisonment for two
years, and put on bond in addition. The discussion at 115-116
shows that France wanted an even more severe penalty. The case
is suggestive of the manner in which the United States has on
occasion made a small nation eat crow for failing to give adequate
protection to an official. Cf. the Iranian incident, 18 Am. J.
Int'l L. 768 (1924).
65. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (U.S. 1796).
66. U. S. v. Liddle, 2 Wash. 205 (C.C.Pa. 1808); U. S. v. Hand,
id. at 435 (1810). This is not to say that the foreign-minister
clause was essential to the taking of jurisdiction in cases like
that of de Longchamps, since these would become federal
questions without that clause under Art.1, §8, cl.10 (offenses
against the law of nations). This is none the less suggestive
of the general kind of trouble the delegates had in mind. A
typical example of the sort of problem in foreign relations
which belongs in federal court, in this case in admiralty, is The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch 116 (U.S. 1812).
67. 1 Farrand 124.
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C. Property and Trade
to all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution,
the laws of the United States and Treaties made, or which
shall be made . . . ; between a State and Citizens of another
State, between citizens of different States; between Citizens
of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects."
The Constitution, said Hamilton while its ratification
was pending, had "the good will o4 commercial interest
throughout the states which will give all its efforts to the
establishment of a government capable of regulating, pro-
tecting, and extending the commerce of the Union . . . the
good will of most men of property in the several states who
wish a government of the Union able to protect them against
domestic violence and the depredations which the democratic
spirit is apt to make on property."6  Article III was a part
of a unified program calculated to enlist the support of "most
men of property."
For this purpose the most obvious clause was that giving
jurisdiction in federal question cases. The three central pro-
hibitions of the Constitution from a standpoint of contem-
porary economic interest were the prohibitions on state im-
pairment of contracts, state currency, and state tariffs.69
If a state should violate these prohibitions the courts were to
invalidate the violating statutes. 70 In addition, Congress
could regulate commerce, and impinging state regulations
could be invalidated by jurisdiction granted under the phrase
"constitution or laws."
The treaty jurisdiction was an important element of the
Constitution viewed either from the standpoint of interna-
tional affairs or of economic matters. The basic power to
make treaties gave rise to fears, notably in Kentucky, that
treaties inimical to regional economic interests would be made
and enforced.71  In addition, the phrase giving jurisdiction
68. IV Doc. Hist. 288 (1787).
69. These three basic prohibitions are discussed together by Madison
in Federalist Paper XLIV.
70. Discussed by Hamilton in Federalist Paper LXXVIII, in which
he analyzes the judiciary as "an essential safeguard against the
effects of occasional ill humors in the society."
71. The argument skillfully made to the delegates from Kentucky at
the Virginia convention was that the southern states would never
willingly give up the navigation of the Mississippi to the Spanish,
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in cases arising from "Treaties made, or which shall be made"
torpedoed the hopes of those who desired to avoid the pay-
ment- of British debts, secured under the Treaty of 17832
Madison said, "The articles relating to Treaties-to paper
money, and to contracts, created more enemies than all the
errors in the System positive and negative put together."73
The remaining clauses can be viewed from many stand-
points, and this sketch will deal with three: (1) What was
the relation of real property interests to the judicial article?
(2) What was the basic purpose of the diversity jurisdiction?
(3) Measured by the use actually made of the federal courts
in the period immediately after their creation, what conclu-
sions, if any, can be drawn about the purposes of Article III?
For such illumination as it may shed on the other two ques-
tions, the third will be considered first.
1. The Federal Courts, 1790-1815.
A statistical analysis of the actual operations of the fed-
eral courts, even in their infancy, is far from being a fool-
proof means of determining their purpose. The Founding
Fathers may have made mistakes of judgment about what
would prove important, and the growth of the country itself
materially affected the business of the courts.
None the less, performance is at least some measure of
purpose. It permits the statement of some working hypo-
theses which, tested against others, may indicate fruitful lines
for analysis. For this limited purpose, the following data is
offered.
Table 1 gives a jurisdictional and functional analysis for
434 cases reported in the Supreme Court in the years 1790-
1815. The sources of the cases and the problems and weak-
nesses of classification are discussed in the appended note.
while the northern states were indifferent to it. Under the Con-
federation, southern votes could block such a move, but under the
Constitution the southern states might be outvoted. See, for a
few of many examples of this discussion, the remarks of Henry
at 3 Elliott 151, 152; Lee, id. at 182; Grayson, id. at 501, 505.
72. 1 Beveridge, "Life of John Marshall" 441, 444 (1916).





Business of the Supreme Court, 1790-181574
JUIUSDICTION 11790-180011801-181011811-18151 Total
Original .......................................................... 8 1 0
Diversity ........................................................ 18 71 46 135
Admiralty ...................................................... 16 22 46 84
U.S. Civil ...................................................... 3 17 12 32
U.S. Criminal ................................................ 1 3 2 6
Appeals, state courts .................................... 3 7 7 17
District of Columbia .................................... 0 79 41 120
Miscellaneous ................................................ 7 21 3 31
Total ..................... ... .......... - I - - 434
EcoxomIc BASS
Credit (bills, notes, bonds, etc.) .............. 9 30 15 54
Contracts for goods and services ............ 2 13 6 21
Contracts relating to land (sales, rents,
mortgages) ............................................ 4 23 26 53
Controversies relating to public land
grants .................................................... 4 12 9 25
Insurance ...................................................... 0 23 16 39
Maritime
Prize or salvage ................................ 15 26 47 88
Contract (excluding insurance) ........ 1 3 2 6
Collisions .............................................. 0 0 0 0
E states .......................................................... 1 10 4 15
Slaves ............................................................ 0 6 2 8
T orts .............................................................. 0 1 0 1
U.S. Civil ...................................................... 3 21 15 39
U.S. Crim inal ................................................ 1 5 2 8
Miscellaneous or unclear ............................ 16 48 13 77
Total ...................................................... I - I - I =-- I 434
Table 2 gives a similar analysis of 647 cases reported in
the federal circuit courts in the same period.75
74. This table omits those cases reported so briefly that, without the
record, not even an intelligent guess can be made as to either
jurisdiction or interest. The miscellaneous category includes the
few patent cases. The seventy-seven "miscellaneous or unclear"
cases in the economic table include sixty-eight cases in which the
report is too short to permit a guess at the interest.
Credit cases have been put as a separate category from sales,
contracts, and mortgages for two reasons: (1) many of the reports
reveal that the suit was on a note, but not what the note secured;
(2) in the early economy, with shortage of money and in the
absence of corporate stocks and bonds, notes were used as a
medium of exchange or for speculation. Hence they represent a
separable interest. For a good example of a wandering note, see
Steimnetz v. Currie, 1 Dall. 269 (Pa. 1788). The economic table
attempts to reach the fundamental interest without regard to form.
For example, there are !more cases involving government civil
interests or maritime interests than actually arise jurisdictionally
in that form.
75. The comments in the preceding note are applicable here. These
cases were taken from the following reports: 2-4 Dallas; Brunner;
Wallace Sr.; 1-3 Washington; 1 Brockenborough; 1 Peters (cir-
cuit) ; 1 Paine; 1-2 Gallison.
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TABLE 2
Business of the Federal Circuit Courts, 1790-1815
sUWSOICTION 11790 - 180011801-1 8 111if8-81-1- I Total-
Diversity ........................................................ 23 212 133 368
Admiralty ...................................................... 1 23 104 128
U.S. Civil ...................................................... 2 10 37 49
U.S. Crimina ................................................ 14 23 28 65
Miscellaneous .............................................. 3 19 15 37
Total ...................................................... I - I - i - 647
ECONOUIC BASE
Credit (bills, notes, bonds, etc.) ............ 7 45 23 75
Contracts for goods and services .......... 29 14 44
Contracts relating to land (sales, rents,
mortgages) ............................................ 7 43 46 96
Controversies relating to public land
grants .................................................... 1 7 1 9
Insurance ...................................................... 2 50 16 68
Maritime
Prize or salvage .................................. 2 17 87 106
Contract (excluding insurance) ........ 0 22 21 43
Collision ................................................ 0 1 0 1
E states .......................................................... 0 3 11 14
Slaves ................................ 0 2 2 4
Torts ... .............................. 2 4 4 10
U.S. Clvi ............................. 2 12 38 52
U.S. Criminal .................... ..... 14 23 28 65
Miscellaneous or unclear ............................ 5 29 26 60
Tol ................................................. I - I - _ - 647
On the basis of these tables and the underlying study,
certain conclusions may be stated:
.1 Quantity of cases is not in itself a highly significant
measure of constitutional purpose. Else one would be forced
to believe that a primary purpose in creating the Supreme
Court was to furnish a tribunal for the settlement of cases
arising in the District of Columbia.
2. There was, quantitatively, very little immediate need
for a Supreme Court in 1787 or for some years thereafter.
3. Many of the large number of District of Columbia
cases could have been diversity cases had they arisen else-
where. Such factors as physical distance probably discour-
aged the institution of cases in other federal trial courts and
certainly discouraged appeals from other federal courts.
4. The number of serious and important federal ques-
tions actually considered in the Supreme Court was minute.
United States civil and criminal cases were few and, for the
most part, trifling. The number of appeals from state courts
which could raise serious federal questions was only seventeen
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in twenty-five years, and while important public questions
arose from other sources, they were rare.7 6
5. At the beginning of the period, the principal eco-
nomic groups involved in litigation, quantitatively at least,
were the shipping industry, the holders of bills and notes, and
those who dealt in land. However, a new industry, insurance,
was on the horizon, and by 1815 furnished an important part
of federal work. The shipping problems were primarily prize
and salvage, although before the end of the period contract
cases were appearing; and most of the insurance cases were
ship insurance problems. Throughout the period, however,
and particularly at the beginning, the international aspects of
admiralty were the most important in litigation. Tort cases
in diversity were almost nonexistent, as were problems of
banks or corporations.
6. In the lower courts the business originated predomi-
nantly in diversity and admiralty. Excluding the District of
Columbia cases, the principal differences between the two
levels of courts in this period were that the lower courts had
a somewhat. higher proportion of Government business and
had received more maritime contract problems other than
insurance.
7. The whole federal judicial system from 1790 to 1815
gave almost its entire attention to the settlement of the
simplest types of commercial and property disputes. It was,
in addition, enforcing some federal statutes, particularly those
relating to the shipping embargo and the War of 1812. Over
half of the small business of the federal courts could have
been handled substantially as well in state tribunals.
2. Land Titles
Assuming that historians need no longer re-contest the
ground which Dr. Charles A. Beard has already won, we may
start with a fixed assumption that economic events have a
great deal to do with political and constitutional develop-
ments. That being so, the relation of land speculation to the
Constitution and to the Judiciary Article presents a puzzling
problem on which only the most tentative observations can be
made at the present stage of research. Yet despite lack of
tangible evidence, it would surpass belief that this portion
76. For examples, Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803),
original; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (U.S. 1810), diversity.
I
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of the Constitution could have been written without consider-
ation of land speculating interests.
In 1787 there were fortunes to be made in buying land
cheaply from state or federal governments, bringing in set-
tlers from the East or from Europe, and selling at a good
profit. Prior to the Revolution there were ten principal land
companies in the colonies, the two best known in our own
age being the Ohio Company of 1748, in which George Wash-
ington was an active participant, and the Transylvania pro-
ject, remembered principally because its promoter, Richard
Henderson, bought 20,000 acres in Kentucky from the Chero-
kees at three cents an acre and sent Daniel Boone on his way
to legend by making him the explorer of the area.7 7
These concerns knew how to manipulate governments.
Frequently they had to know.78 Administrative officials were
cut in when necessary to win official approval.79 These were
big operations, carried on by men of imagination and power.
After the Revolution it was no longer necessary for the specu-
lators to deal with a distant England, and they turned their
whole attention to the state, Confederation, and national gov-
ernments.
Within a few years of the Revolution ten more great land
companies were formed.80 Among those interested were
many of the principal figures of the Constitutional Conven-
tion. The largest of all was Robert Morris of Pennsylvania,
who in 1791 owned, among other land interests, 5,300,000
acres in western New York and who may well have been
77. There has been extensive publication on the land companies. How-
ever, a number of writers have become preoccupied with the
scandals, and obscured the facts. The leading general work on
land policy is Hibbard, "A History of the Public Land Policies"(1924), and a good specialized work on this period which analyzes
separately each of the ten companies referred to is Livermore,
"Early American Land Companies" 74-132 (1938). Land sales
under the Confederation are discussed sedately in Treat, "The
National Land System, 1785-1820" 41-66 (1910), and considerably
less sedately in Sakolski, "The Great American Land Bubble"
1-123 (1932); Chandler, "Land Title Origins" 72 et seq. (1945).
78. It is principally to the Ohio Company of Associates, which desired
to obtain and sell land in Ohio, that credit should go for the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which established a government
for that area. For one of many discussions, see Beard, "The Rise
of American Civilization" 510-513 (1935 ed.). The problem is
briefly mentioned in Rodell, "Fifty-five Men" 18 (1936).
79. See, for example, the participation of Lord Dunmore, Governor
of Virginia, in the affairs of the Indiana Company, Livermore,
op. cit. supra n.77, at 108.
80. Each is described in id. at 133-214.
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the biggest real estate speculator of all time."' Both Morris
and his lawyer, James Wilson, were strong Federalist dele-
gates to the Convention from Philadelphia, and Wilson, one of
Washington's first appointees to the Supreme Court, was
active in the formulation of the judicial portions of the Con-
stitution. Other delegates active in land speculation were
Washington and Mason of Virginia, Blount of South Carolina,
Carroll of Maryland, Dayton of New Jersey, Fitzsimmons
and Franklin of Pennsylvania, and at least five others .2
Not only were the speculators, or persons interested in
speculation, participants in the Convention, but they were in
various other ways close to Convention members. One of
Washington's principal non-convention advisers, for example,
and his first Secretary of War, was General Henry Knox of
New York, who in 1791 was one of a group which bought two
million acres in Maine at ten cents an acre.8 3 The Reverend
Manasseh Cutler, preacher, botanist, and businessman, was at
the very moment of the Philadelphia Convention engaged be-
fore the Confederation Congress in New York in wangling a
1i/2-million-acre grant for his Ohio Company of Associates.
Cutler was compelled to take 31/2 million acres more than he
wanted, to be divided among persons of influence, in order
to get his own grant of 1 million.84 While working on his
great project in New York he came to Philadelphia and had
an extended and congenial visit, including an outing in the
country, with Convention delegates Madison, Hamilton,
Mason, and Rutledge, among others85 He* eventually went
back to Massachusetts and supported ratification there.
Several of the jurisdictional clauses were of actual prac-
tical significance to large landholders. The most obvious rele-
vant clause was that granting jurisdiction in controversies
"between Citizens of the same state claiming lands under
81. Oberholtzer, "Robert Morris, Patroit and Financier" (1903). On
the New York speculations, see Sakolski, op. cit. supra n.77, c.3.
82. List taken from Beard, "Economic Interpretation of the Consti-
tution" c.5, and particularly 151. (193.5 ed.).
83. Livermore. op. cit. supra n.77, at 174-177. For an extended
statement by Knox to Washington of the former's pre-Convention
views, see letter, Jan. 4, 1787, IV Doc. Hist. 58.
84. For a crisp account of the incident see Beard, "The Rise of
American Civilization" (1935 ed.). For a leisurely account, the
Cutler Diary is fascinating reading. 1 "Life, Journals and Corres-
pondence of Rev. Manasseh Cutler, LL.D." 119-373 (W. Parker
and Julia P. Cutler, eds., 1888).
-85. Cutler Diary, supra, n.84, July 14, 1787, at 271-279.
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grants of different states," a clause that at least possibly could
affect every eastern speculator who held land in Ohio, Ken-
tucky, Tennessee, or Maine-areas soon likely to become new
states and to have some notions of their own as to who should
own the lands within their borders6
However, the diversity and treaty clauses were the juris-
dictional clauses most immediately affecting large landed
interests. The wording of the treaty clause alone determined
who should own several hundred thousand acres in the North-
ern Neck of Virginia; and the diversity clause permitted spe-
culators holding land under state grants to litigate questions
of title in federal courts which, it must be remembered, were
to be part of a government friendly to "men of property."
The implications of the Constitution for land-holding
interests received comparatively little recorded public dis-
cussion in the course of ratification of the Constitution. A
local appeal to New Hampshire based on the "grants of dif-
ferent states" clause is a rare instance of public attention .8
In Virginia, however, the ratifying convention did discuss
the clauses in relation to the two specific land interests of
that state, the Fairfax estate and the Indiana Company. A
word must be said as to each.
Lord Fairfax, Washington's friend and neighbor, held
title before the Revolution to some 300,000 acres in that
northeastern sector of Virginia south of the Potomac known
as the Northern Neck. Virginia confiscated interests in these
with other royalist lands and parceled some of them out again.
Among others, George Mason had a substantial interest in
them after the reshuffling. Mason was one of Virginia's
wealthiest men and had been a delegate at Philadelphia but
refused to sign the Constitution. With Patrick Henry, he led
the opposition in Virginia 8  The treaty of peace in 1783
86. This clause seems to have originated in the efforts of Vermont
to secure independence from both New Hampshire and New York.
Sharp controversies followed Vermont's "declaration of inde-
pendence" from its neighbors on January 15, 1777; and in 1779, as
a result of border controversies, Congress requested the states
involved to permit it to resolve disputes arising out of land grants
from the different states. For details see 131 U.S., App. I-liii.
87. Agrippa (James Winthrop), in Ford, "Essays on the Constitution"
75 (1892),
88. See Hill, "George Mason" (1938), passim, and on his opposition
to the Constitution, 213-238. A rather remarkable theory of
the reason for the divergence of the Virginia political leaders on
the Constitution is offered in an earnestly anti-constitutional
study, Grigsby, "The History of the Virginia Federal Convention"
1948] 259
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promised a return of the confiscated property. The one
chance of the Fairfax heirs was that a federal judiciary might
enforce that treaty.
Whether the Indiana Company took an active part in the
Virginia convention has not been traced, but it had probably
the largest immediate stake in the adoption of the Constitu-
tion of any business enterprise existing in 1787. In 1768,
after the most elaborate negotiations, the Indiana Company
"bought" from the Indians of the Six- Nations 3 million
acres of land in what is now West Virginia. Between 1776
and 1779 the issue of title was foujht out with Virginia.
Mason led the opposition and Edmund Randolph represented
the company before the Virginia assembly in those years.
Mason prevailed and the company seemed lost. Meanwhile
many Virginians settled in the claimed area. 9
Mason's attack on the judiciary sections at the Virginia
convention was specific and candid. He could not vote for
the Constitution so long as the judiciary clause stood as it
was. He reminded his listeners that his own pecuniary in-
terests demanded the non-enforcement of the Treaty of 1783.
If it were ever enforced, he conceded, his own interests in the
Fairfax land would be adversely affected.90 In addition, he
argued, the Constitution would give the Indiana Company an
opportunity to reassert its claim before the federal courts, and
therefore the residents of the area involved should oppose
the Constitution if they did not want to pay tithes to the In-
9 Va. Hist. Soc. Collec. 42, n.48 (1890); Washington, Pendleton,
Wythe, and Madison were the strongest supporters of the Con-
stitution. If one looks to unconscious guiding factors "it may be
said that they were all men of wealth, or held office by a life
tenure, and that, though married, neither of them ever had a
child. In the same spirit it may be mentioned that Mason and
Henry were men of large families, and that hundreds now living
look back to 'Gunston Hall' or 'Red Hill.' In the case of Henry,
the cradle began to rock in his house in his eighteenth year, and
was rocking at his death in his sixty-third."
89. For an extended account of these affairs see Lewis, "The Indiana
Company, 1763-1798" (1941). Failing in Virginia, the company
appealed to the Confederation Congress, hiring Thomas Paine as
its propagandist for 300 shares. Paine wrote a pamphlet in
support of the company entitled "Public Good. " These latter
incidents are described in Jensen, "The Articles of Confederation"
121 et seq., 218, 233 (1940).
90. "I am personally endangered as an inhabitant of the Northern
Neck. The people of, that part will be obliged, by the operation
of this power, to pay the quitrent of their lands. Whatever other
gentlemen may think, I consider this as a most serious alarm."
3 Elliott 528.
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diana Company.9 1 He proposed an amendment that the fed-
eral judicial power should apply only to such causes of action
arising after the adoption of the Constitution.92
Marshall and Randolph, among others, answered that
Mason's fears were groundless because the federal judiciary
would respect the Virginia determination on the Indiana Com-
pany; and that if the Fairfax heirs were entitled to the land,
they should have it. 93
Mason's predictions were shrewd. Within a few years
Marshall became counsel for the Fairfax interests, and even-
tually, financed by Robert Morris, a Marshall syndicate
bought the property.9 4 The Supreme Court upheld the Fair-
fax-Marshall title.95 The Indiana Company did sue Virginia
in the United States Supreme Court, which took jurisdiction.2
Thereupon Virginia and Georgia, concerned because of Chis-
holm v. Georgia, allied in writing the Eleventh Amendment
and sovereign immunity into the Constitution, and the In-
diana Company's claims were finally dismissed. 7
As Tables 1 and 2 show, there is record of nine cases in
the lower court reports and twenty-five in the Supreme Court
involving interests in public lands between 1790 and 1815.
Most of these were small affairs, quarrels over soldiers'
bounty land, for example. But some were important. The
Fairfax estate case, arising as a federal question based on the
treaty clause has been mentioned. Fletcher v. Peck,9 a feign-
ed case brought in diversity to settle the title to the Yazoo
lands in Georgia, is well known. Another was Fitzsimmons
91. Id. at 529.
92. Id. at 530.
93. Id. at 559, 574. Beveridge notes that Marshall himself "was then
personally interested in the Fairfax title," and adds, "His own and
his father's lands in Fauquier County were derived through the
Fairfax title." 1 Beveridge, op. cit. supra n.72, at 448. Randolph,
formerly counsel for the Indiana Company, assured the delegates
that in the future "the remedy will not be sought against the
settlers, but [against] the state of Virginia." 3 Elliott 574.
94. The transaction is described in 2 Beveridge, op. cit. supra n.72 at
199-211.
95. Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 603 (U.S. 1813);
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (U.S. 1816).
96. Grayson v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 320 (U.S. 1796).
97. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (U.S. 1798). For an
analysis of this litigation, and the steps taken by Virginia, see
Lewis, op. cit. supra n.89, at 277-291.
98. 6 Cranch 87 (U.S. 1810).
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v. Ogden,"° in which, in an extremely complicated situation,
Gouverneur Morris, a delegate at Philadelphia, emerged tri-
umphant with the stupendous remnant of, Robert Morris'
fallen estate. The case arose in diversity and involved no
federal question. The Court found that G. Morris had been
"unkind" but not fraudulent to the R. Morris interests.
Other land company cases were Huidekoper's Lessee v.
Douglass,100 a case which may also have been carefully ar-
ranged to put it into diversity. The issue was whether the
Holland Company, purchaser of hundreds of thousands of
acres from Pennsylvania, should lose title for failure to give
full compliance with its contract. Marshall's language in de-
ciding this non-federal question is revealing of the Court's
essential spirit of friendliness to the land companies. 1' In
Pendleton and Webb v. Wambersie,'02 the Court in kindly
fashion lent federal jurisdiction to untangling the affairs of
a land company which had stretched its shoe string beyond
the breaking point, and in Town of Pawlet v. Clark'03 it gave
full-and logical-scope to the clause concerning grants from
two states.
This much of a hypothesis is offered for further ex-
ploration: A large commercial interest in the country and
in the Convention in 1787 was that of the existing or imme-
diately impending land companies. The judiciary article was
specifically discussed in terms of land speculations at least
in Virginia. The Supreme Court aided virtually every land
speculator who came before it from 1790 to 1815,04 and the
federal jurisdictional clauses and particularly the diversity
clause gave most material assistance for that purpose. In
all probability the drafters at Philadelphia, or at least some
of them, had some such benefits in mind as one of the factors
influencing their drafting of Article III.
3. The Diversity Jurisdiction
The most obvious explanation of the two clauses in
99. 7 Cranch 2 (U.S. 1812).
100. 3 Cranch 1 (U.S. 1805).
101. Id. at 70-71.
102. 4 Cranch 73 (U.S. 1807).
103. 9 Cranch 292 (U.S. 1815).
104. Except for George Mason. Had he lived, his cup of misery would
have run over when he lost title to 8300 acres of land in Kentucky
on the ground of improprieties in his survey. Wilson v. Richard
Mason, devisee of George Mason, 1 Cranch 45 (U.S. 1801).
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Article III giving jurisdiction in private cases in which one
party is not a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought
is the explanation most often given: the drafters of the Con-
stitution thought either that justice or the important appear-
ance of justice would be denied if such cases were left to
state decision. So Marshall early declared.os
But the brilliant article by Mr. Friendly in 192810 6 and
the forceful statement by then Professor Frankfurter,1 07 based
in part on the Friendly researches, casts grave doubts on the
accuracy of the obvious. Their publications and the firm
response of Professor Yntema and Mr. Jaffin leave the reason
for diversity a matter of sharp disagreement.10 8
The Friendly-Frankfurter position in rough summary
may be put thus: An examination of available records, parti-
cularly decisions of state appellate courts before 1787, does
not show any record of bias of state courts in favor of their
own citizens. The records and debates at Philadelphia and
in the states show no evidence of a conviction that such
bias existed, for not one speaker made a clear statement to
that effect. Those debates do show that support for diversity
jurisdiction, even among its friends such as Wilson and Mar-
shall, was "tepid," and that it was based essentially not on
fear of regional bias but on fears of class bias: e.g., that in
a vague but real sense the drafters of Article III thought
that the federal courts would counterbalance the spirit of
paper money and debt relief in state legislatures.210 Actual
local hostility, says Friendly, "had only a speculative exist-
ence in 1789."110
To this Yntema and Jaffin say, essentially, "Unproved."
There are too few recorded cases to measure actual hos-
105. The Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 87 (U.S.
1809). For fuller statement of this view, see Story, "Com-
mentaries on the Constitution" 629 et seq. (1833).
106. Friendly, "The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction" 41 Harv.
L. Rev. 483 (1928).
107. Frankfurter, "Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts," 13 Corn. L. Q. 499 (1928).
108. Yntema and Jaffin, "Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Juris-
diction" 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 869 (1931).
109. "The available records disclose no particular grievance against
state tribunals for discrimination against litigants from without.
The real fear was of state legislatures, not of state courts."
Frankfurter, supra n.107 at 520.
110. Friendly, supra n.106, at 510.
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tility, they say;"' and the absence of discussion in 1787 and
1788 may mean merely that it was impolitic and unnecessary
to attack state judges. 112  From the records they extract
phrases which indicate there was actual hostility."3 Yntema
and Jaffin do not contend that they have proved the essential
bulwark of this position: that it is incredible that in the nar-
row, provincial, petty spirit of intercolonial relations, there
should not have been local bias in the administration of
justice." 4
Both positions carry persuasion despite apparent conflict
On the one hand it is incredible that the colonies should have
administered justice, with complete fairness to each other.
On the other hand, it is true that there was very little con-
crete evidence of hostility in specific lawsuits. The evidence
does show that in 1787 bias in interstate lawsuits was more
an anticipated than an existing evil.
The explanation of the paradox of inevitable bias and
yet no bias lies in the character of pre-1787 litigation. In the
first place, there is some record of actual bias, intra-empire
if not interstate. There can be no doubt, for example, of
direct bias in the administration of justice against British
creditors in Virginia. There in 1770 the jurisdiction of the
Court of Hustings at Williamsburg, in which creditors had
previously proceeded, was sharply constricted for the purpose
of putting creditors at the mercy of county courts which
could be relied upon to make debt collection difficult."1 The
purpose was contemporaneously so understood."16 Similarly
111. Yntema, supra n.108, at 876, n.13.
112. Id. at 875, n.13. If, for example, the hypothesis advanced earlier
of relation of land interests to the judiciary is sound, it is
easy to believe that in 1787 as at some other times politicians
were not talking about all the subjects they were thinking about.
Madison wrote Hamilton as follows during the Virginia considera-
tion of the judiciary: "The attacks on it [the judiciary] have
apparently made less impression than was feared. But they may
be secretly felt by particular interests that would not make the
acknowledgment, and wd. chuse to ground their vote agst. the
Constitution on other motives." Letter, June 22, 1788, IV Doc.
Hist. 745.
113. Yntema, supra n.108, at 876, n.13.
114. The conviction that "the theory of no local prejudice is pre-
sumptively improbable" is stated and documented in Yntema supra
n.108, at 876, n.13.
115. 8 Henning (Va. Stat.) 401, 402.
116. John Tazewell, Williamsburg attorney, wrote his client, John
Norton, English Merchant, on July 12, 1770: "If this Law is not
disallowed, Creditors for the recovery of their Debts must either
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at least two of the state judgments in admiralty cases be-
tween 1777 and 1786 were probably products of bias in favor
of state interests.1 17
And yet the problem was not an acute one in 1787 for
reasons going to the nature of the domestic economy of the
colonies and states. There was too little significant inter-
state business litigation to give room for serious actual abra-
sion.
Table 3 analyzes 554 reported cases in seven colonies and
states from 1658 to 1787. These are substantially all avail-
able reported cases.'"8  The table cannot be accurate, for in
too many cases one can at best make a good guess as to whe-
ther a case was of local or diverse origin. Many doubts were
decided in favor of listing the case in diversity.
TABLE 3
Distribution of Local and Diversity Cases, Colonial and
State Courts, 1658-1787 (Scattered Reports)
State I Local Origin I Diverse Origin
Connecticut .................. .192 26
Maryland .................... .136 6
Massachusetts ................ .. 67 2
North Carolina ............... .. 4 1
Pennsylvania ................. I.74 13
South Carolina ............... .. 28 6
Virginia ..................... 38 1
1 539 90.74% 1 55 9.26%
These data and the underlying cases indicate that the
volume and certainly the proportion of interstate commercial
litigation were extremely low. This is indicated by several
factors: (1) A higher proportion of diversity than of local
bring their suits in the General or County Courts where Years
must elapse before an unjust or unwilling debtor can be brought
to Justice." Quoted in Chumbley, "Colonial Justice in Virginia"
148, 150 (1938), as part of a general discussion of this subject.
English agents charged the purpose of the change of jurisdiction
was to make debt collection difficult, and Chumbley concludes, "An
unbiased study of the matter indicates that they were right in
their conclusions." Id. at 148.
117. For details see Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 54 (U.S. 1795), and
U. S. v. Judge Peters, 5 Cranch 115 (U.S. 1809).
118. These cases are taken from "Kirby" and the "Acorn Club Kirby
Supplement of 1933" (Conn.); 1 Harris & McHenry (Md.);
Quincy (Mass.); 1 Martin (N.C.); 1 and 2 Dallas (Pa.); 1 Bay
(S.C.); Jefferson and 4 Call (Va.). It cannot be too strongly
emphasized that these records are in such form that the listings
are very nearly guess work. A large number of cases on which
not even a guess could be made are omitted.
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cases must have been appealed or come into the reports, be-
cause such cases would have to be of at least some importance
to be worth bringing in the first place. It is probably safe
to assume that if from these sources we find 9.26 per cent
of the cases in diversity, the actual proportion was far lower.
(2) Many of these cases were not interstate cases, but Eng-
lish-state cases. In the six Maryland diversity cases, for
example, four probably involved English interests. 1 9  (3) Of
the American cases remaining after the English cases are
eliminated, few involved commercial problems. The credit
cases were with England. In South Carolina, for example,
one of the diversity cases involved a drunken brawl and an-
other involved slave stealing. 120
To understand the judiciary of 1787, one must of course
understand the country, and the country was growing and
changing so quickly that the commercial America of 1800
was substantially different from the commercial America of
1780. When the Constitution was drafted the underlying
economic developments which we assume when we speak of
diversity jurisdiction today had barely begun to exist. First,
there was substantial interstate and intercolonial trade in the
period before 1780, but both in volume and in dollar value it
was less significant than the West Indian trade or the Eu-
ropean trade.12' Second, the intercolonial trade was predomi-
119. Hyde & Co. v. Bradford's Ex., 1 H. & McH. 82 (Md. 1730);
Brent's Lessee v. Tasker, id. at 89 (1737); Black v. Digge's Ex.,
id. at 153 (1744); Burk v. M'Clain, id. at 236 (1766). The last
case discusses the relation of various problems of debt collection
to convenience of trade between England and Maryland.
120. Genay v. Norris, 1 Bay 6 (S.C. 1784); Porter v. Dunn, id. at 53
(1786 or 1787).
121. It is extremely difficult to find statistical analyses of early trade,
because not enough statistics were kept. The first important con-
temporary statistical study of trade is Coxe, "A View of the
United States" (1794). Coxe was Commissioner of Revenue.
However, most of his data begins about 1790, and he has more
data on exports and imports than interstate trade. A statistical
reconstruction has been done in the Carnegie Institution publica-
tion by Emory R. Johnson and others, "History of Domestic and
Foreign Commerce of the United States" (1915). The materials
vol. .1, 112-121 and 162-174, and particularly the analysis at 171.
with tables, present the best picture of trade. Other significant
studies are Pitkin, "A Statistical View of the Commerce of the
United States" (1835); and two Columbia University studies,
East, "Business Enterprise in the American Revolutionary Era"
(1938), and Kraus, "Intercolonial Aspects of American Culture
on the Eve of the Revolution" (1928). The German pamphlet,
Shirach, "Historisch-Statistiche Notiz der Grossbrittanishen
Colonien in Amerika" (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1776), has the ad-
vantage of contemporaneity although its author had not been in
the Colonies.
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nantly of a very local variety. Thus New York was the har-
bor for New Jersey and Connecticut, and Philadelphia ship-
ped the produce of Delaware. 12 2  The national business enter-
prise of the sort that now utilizes diversity jurisdiction did
not exist. In 1780 the colonies had no banks, and, as Tables
1 and 2 show, the insurance business had scarcely begun to
affect litigation.123 Though land speculation was large busi-
ness, its days of big litigation were largely in the offing.
Third, interstate transactions were principally on a barter,
paper-money, or very short-term basis. There was credit in
the colonies both before and after the Revolution, but it was
credit from England.224
122. This is not to say that there was no long-distance intercolonial
trade. Boston and Newport merchants traded all over the coast,
Johnson, supra n.121, at 170; and products such as paper and
books went from Philadelphia to the South. See Hanna, "The
Trade of the Delaware District Before the Revolution" 2 Smith
Coll. Studies in Hist. 241-245 (1916-17), for a statement of the
nature of trade districts, and id. at 261 et. seq. on trade from
Philadelphia to the South. But Hanna concludes that the West
Indian trade was "the basis of the commercal life of this district."
Some colonies had a higher proportion of intercolonial trade
than others because they were in marketing districts pivoting on
neighboring cities. New Hampshire, New Jersey, Connecticut, and
Delaware are examples. Johnson, op. cit. supra n.121, at 168.
It will be noted from Table 3 that Connecticut had an unusually
large proportion of diversity cases, analyzed by Friendly, supra n.
106, at 493, 494. It is doubtless no accident that the one concrete
example Madison gave the Virginia convention of the necessity of
diversity jurisdiction was that "before the war, New York was to
a great amount a creditor of Connecticut. While it depended on
the laws and regulations of Connecticut, she might withhold pay-
ment. If I be not misinformed, there were reasons to complain." 3
Elliott 535 (italics added).
123. The Bank of North America, a Morris enterprise but with na-
tional participation, was founded in 1781. The Bank of New York
and the Massachusetts Bank followed in 1784. A second series of
banks began shortly after the adoption of the Constitution. For
discussion, see East, op. cit. supra n.121, c.XIII, Commercial
Banks, 1781-92. Small insurance offices began in New York and
Philadelphia about 1760 and began to achieve importance during
the war; id. at 69-71. By 1834, there were 503 banks with a
capital of $203,000,000; Pitkin, op. cit. supra n.121, at 460.
124. Colonial credit and investment practices showing that credits were
scattered but not unknown are described in East, op. cit. supra n.
121, at 15-23. But as Franklin said in his Address on a Com-
mercial System, May 11, 1787, "In this country the consumer's
money follows the delivery of the manufacture, therefore less
capital is required." Coxe, op. cit. supra n.121, at 19. He also
refers to European credit, speaking of "the prodigious credit
there given to our merchants on the return of peace." Id. at
26, 27. As Johnson, op. cit. supra n.121, at 126, puts it,
... American commerce, not only in colonial times but after the
Revolution, was carried on very largely by the aid of British
capital. There was a scarcity of capital in America, and mer-
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Thus the actualities of trade coupled with the record of
litigation combine to give this description: There was very
little commercial diversity litigation among the colonies prior
to 1787. What there was arose largely within confined mar-
keting districts in which economic lines deviated slightly from
state lines. National commercial litigation involving far-
flung interests was around the corner after the Revolution.
The cotton gin and the first cotton.mill, large-scale banking
and large-scale insurance were still in the future in 1787.
There was some, but only a little, pre-Revolutionary hostility
in litigation to the commercial interests of other states, but
this may well have been because the occasion for hostility
rarely arose. The typical case was still A v. B for a cow.
To this point, the subject of diversity has been approach-
ed as though there were a rational distinction between anti-
British-creditor hostility and interstate hostilities. For the
post-1763 period of strain between the colonies and England,
this distinction is sensible; but in earlier periods there was
no anti-British-creditor sentiment which could not just as
well have been anti-Philadelphia-banker sentiment had there
been Philadelphia banks. The Philadelphia Convention dealt
with both together by providing federal jurisdiction both for
the extra-state suitors and the extra-national suitors. Madi-
son said in the Virginia convention, speaking of local courts,
"We well know, sir, that foreigners cannot get justice done
them in these courts, and this has prevented many wealthy
gentlemen from trading or residing among us."'1 25 He and
his colleagues obviously thought of national and international
diversity together.
The real key to the diversity clause lies in the optimism
of the founders, an optimism which escapes the label "fan-
tastic" because the dreams so Qften came true. The members
of the Convention did a great deal of anticipating, and on
many subjects besides diversity jurisdiction. They anticipat-
ed manufacture and trade within the United States on an
unknown but vast scale. One of the principal objects of the
Convention was to open a path for that expansion.s 6 If Rob-
chants in the United States traded with British merchants whose
supply of capital enabled them to extend the necessary credit to
American traders after, as well as before, 1783."
125. 3 Elliott 583.
126. In studying the Constitution it should never be forgotten that its
first object was to promote commerce. The delegates originally
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ert Morris could buy five million acres of New York, he could
anticipate gigantic interstate trade. If the Founding Fathers
could anticipate the industrial and commercial revolution, al-
ready beginning, they could anticipate some of the obstacles
to the success of the concomitant business enterprise. The
diversity clauses were based on that dual anticipation more
largely than on experience. Actual experience in quantity
was lacking because the economic order necessary to that ex-
perience had not yet come fully into existence.
At the same time there was an independent but related
factor of judgment that the federal courts would be more
sympathetic to business interests than the state courts. There
was probably a sentiment that land investments would be
safest in the hands of federal judges. It is unnecessary to
restate here the materials covered by Friendly. Suffice it
to say that independent reexamination of the subject results in
the conviction that one heavy factor in establishing diversity
jurisdiction was the consideration of the comparative class
bias of the two systems.
There was probably a third factor of efficiency. Poorly
paid, short-term state judges were, in the minds of the Phila-
delphia Convention, sometimes incompetent and inept.127
To summarize, the diversity jurisdiction in the Federal
Constitution may fairly be said to be the product of three
factors, the relative weights of which cannot now be assessed:
1. The desire to avoid regional prejudice against com-
gathered at Annapolis were directed "to take into consideration
the trade and commerce of the United States; to consider how far
a uniform system in their commercial intercourse and regulations
might be necessary to their common interest and permanent har-
mony." 1 Elliott 117.
127. Madison speaks of the "tardy, and even defective, administration
of justice . in some states." 3 Elliott 533. The foregoing dis-
cussion in this article shows that on occasion the state courts
were not efficient. Irritated counsel in Brown v. Van Braam, 3
Dall. 344, 350 (U.S. 1797), said, "If. disdaining to sanctify the
errors of clerks, and the blunders of yearlings (to whom too often
the business of keeping and making up a record is confided) the
Federal Courts should discountenance and reject the errors and
irregularities of the practice of the State Courts, every suitor
would gratefully acknowledge the obligation." In 1801 Hamilton,
reviewing all the reasons for establishment of a federal judiciary,
spoke of state courts "so constituted as not to afford sufficient
assurance of a pure, enlightened, and independent administration
of justice." 7 Hamilton "Works of Hamilton" 764 (1851). (The
phrase is of course ambiguous and was written in a new contro-
versy but the whole essay of which it is a part coincides to a




mercial litigants, based in small part on experience and in
large part on common-sense anticipation.
2. The desire to permit commercial, manufacturing,
and speculative interests to litigate their controversies, and
particularly their controversies with other classes, before
judges who would be firmly tied to their own interests.12 1
3. The desire to achieve more efficient administration
of justice for the classes thus benefited.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the history of federal jurisdiction and federal courts,
many questions remain unanswered: If Madison and Wilson
had not devised their "Great Compromise" at Philadelphia,
would we today be without lower federal courts? If it had
not been for the necessity of settling international admiralty
disputes, would either the Convention or the Congress of 1789
have created a federal lower court system? In other words,
is the domestic federal legal system predominantly a by-pro-
duct of our international relations? Why-a mystery truly
dark-why did the Congress of 1789 provide that appellate
jurisdiction should be sufficient in federal question cases
while there should be trial court jurisdiction in diversity
cases? Why diversity at all? What is the relationship of
particular economic interests to Article III? But enough of
such a list; there is sufficient mystery left in the origins of
the federal judiciary to keep a good many researchers busy
for a long time.
128. The spirit desired is well indicated in the instructions of Justice
Patterson to a jury while on circuit in Van Home's Lessee v.
Dorrance, 2 Dall, 304, 310, 311 (U.S. 1795). The right of ac-
quiring, possessing, and protecting property is spoken of affec-
tionately as natural and inalienable. Indeed, said Justice Patter-
son. "It is sacred." As a critic of the judiciary system put it,
"The few, the well born, &c. as Mr. Adams calls them, in judicial
decisions as well as in legislation, are generally disposed, and very
naturally too, to favour those of their own description." Lee,
"Letters of a Federal Farmer" in Ford, "Pamphlets on the Con-
stitution" 316 (1888).
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